Abstract. Recently many philosophers and social choice theorists have questioned traditional welfare egalitarianism by introducing a notion of responsibility. They propose to distinguish between two sets of individual characteristics: those for which individuals are to be kept responsible and those for which they can be compensated. This approach raises the related questions of where to draw the line between these two sets of characteristics and how to operationalise the notion of ''responsibility-sensitive fair compensation''. The answers to these questions may depend on the cultural context. We present some empirical results from questionnaire studies in Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia. The notion of control seems to play an important role in determining the variables for which individuals are to be held responsible. The strong notion of ''full compensation'' is clearly rejected in favour of more conservative distribution rules. Moreover, a large fraction of the respondents take the non-liberal position that the talented should be punished if they do not use their talents in a productive way. We find some intercultural differences. Belgian students are more in favour of redistribution. Indonesian students are the most conservative. Soc Choice Welfare (2003) 21: 207-242 DOI: 10.1007 The authors thank Andre´Watteyne and Miryam Wijaya for their help in administering the questionnaire study in Burkina Faso and Indonesia and Bart Cape´au and two anonymous referees for their comments on a first version of the paper. Useful comments and suggestions were also made by Marc Fleurbaey.
Introduction
The traditional welfare economic interpretation of the egalitarian ideal has been in terms of individual welfare levels. Recently more and more economists and philosophers did start questioning this interpretation (see Fleurbaey 1998 , for a survey of this literature). They have proposed to incorporate some notion of responsibility in the formulation of distributive justice by distinguishing between two sets of individual characteristics: those for which individuals have to be compensated and those for which they are to be held responsible. Differences in natural talent could be an obvious example of the former category, effort an example of the latter.
While this is an obvious example, the divide between responsibility-and compensation-variables is less clear-cut in other cases. We could call this the problem of locating the ''responsibility cut'', following Cohen (1989) who introduced the phrase ''Dworkin's cut'' with reference to Dworkin (1981) 's seminal article. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches. One -defended by, e.g., Arneson (1989 Arneson ( , 1990 Arneson ( , 1991 and Cohen (1989 Cohen ( , 1990 ) -emphasizes that the degree of control is crucial: people can only be held responsible for (the consequences of) the individual characteristics which follow from their own voluntary choice. Government should compensate for disadvantages due to personal characteristics beyond the control of the agents. Another approach -initiated by Dworkin (1981) but also defended, e.g., by Scanlon (1988) -emphasizes that responsibility is by delegation: we feel responsible (and are to be held responsible) for some characteristics, because these define our identity. Even if we are not in control, we still feel responsible and we would not accept government interference. In Dworkin (1981) preferences are given as the prime example of this kind of personal characteristics. Government should hold agents responsible for the preferences with which they identify. Only disadvantages resulting from personal resources, whether under control or not, can be subject to compensation. The philosophical debate about these questions is not yet settled. In fact, some authors (Roemer 1993) have taken a relativistic stance and have argued that the dividing line between responsibility and compensation can be seen as culture-dependent.
Even if one reached consensus on the location of the responsibility cut, the first-best distribution problem would not yet be solved. Fleurbaey (1994 Fleurbaey ( , 1995a Fleurbaey ( , 1995b Fleurbaey ( , 1998 has shown in a series of papers that some basic intuitions concerning responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism are conflicting. Therefore it is not a priori obvious what is the ''best'' distribution mechanism to implement a responsibility-sensitive approach.
How should these difficult normative questions be settled? There can be no doubt that ''essential ingredients of a debate over normative issues are critical reflection and thorough assessment of the arguments being used'' (Bossert 1998) . We do feel, however, that this theoretical debate can also be enriched by bringing in some empirical information on the moral intuitions and opinions of uninformed respondents (Miller 1992 (Miller , 1994 . This information can make the theorists better aware of the limitations of their models and of the possible influences from their own particular social and cultural background. Starting with the influential paper by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) , there is now a growing body of empirical research along these lines. An overview can be found in Schokkaert (1999) . In the same spirit, we have constructed a questionnaire which is geared explicitly towards the theoretical work on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. The results of a partial pretesting with Belgian students, on which we reported in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998) were quite promising, both with respect to the quality of the questionnaire and with respect to the acceptance of the responsibility-sensitive compensation framework. In this paper we report on a broader study, where an improved and extended version of the questionnaire was submitted to first-year university students in Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia. This brings in the intercultural dimension.
Our questions are mainly situated within the quasi-linear model of Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) . We interpret this model both in the context of income redistribution and in the context of subsidies for health expenditures. Its most important features are summarised in Sect. 2. Section 3 sketches the empirical setting of our study and the contents of the questionnaire. The results are described in Sect. 4. We first discuss the location of the responsibility cut and we then go deeper into the degree of acceptance of the different axioms and distributional rules. Section 5 concludes.
Responsibility and egalitarianism
Let us first consider a model of income redistribution (Bossert and Fleurbaey 1996) . Assume there are n individuals in society, each characterised by a vector of individual characteristics a i 2 < m , determining their pre-tax income f ða i Þ: A characteristics profile is " a a ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ 2 < nm : The problem is to define an optimal redistribution mechanism, which gives for each possible characteristics profile a vector of post-tax income levels F ð" a aÞ, such that the following budget constraint is satisfied:
Equation (1) implies that the redistribution does not lead to an efficiency loss, i.e., that we are considering a first-best problem. A pure and simple income egalitarian would go for the solution
f ða i Þ; 8i. A responsibility-sensitive egalitarian, however, will point to the possibility that a subset of the characteristics a i are within the responsibility of individual i. Her first problem-locating the responsibility cutthen becomes how to partition the vector a i in ða R i ; a C i Þ, where a R i 2 < r is a vector of ''responsibility''-variables and a C i 2 < c a vector of ''compensation'' variables (with r þ c ¼ m). We mentioned already in the introduction that there is in the literature a lively discussion about this partitioning. Let us now for the sake of the argument accept that a decision on the partitioning has been taken. The second problem is then how this partitioning can be exploited to give a concrete content to the idea of responsibility-sensitivity. Fleurbaey (1994 Fleurbaey ( , 1995a Fleurbaey ( , 1995b Fleurbaey ( , 1998 and Bossert (1995) have modelled two basic intuitions in this respect. We give a brief and mathematically loose summary.
1 The first intuition refers to compensation and reflects the egalitarian aspect of the approach. We will call it full compensation and it states that for all possible " a a, for any two individuals, one should have
If two persons are identical on all characteristics for which they can be held responsible -if they only differ with respect to characteristics for which they must be compensated -then the redistribution mechanism must assign these two persons the same post-tax income. The second intuition captures the idea of responsibility, i.e., of the boundaries to be imposed on egalitarianism. We call it strict compensation and it says that for all possible " a a, for any two individuals, the redistribution mechanism must satisfy
If two persons have identical compensation characteristics, the differences in their pre-tax income will only reflect differences in their responsibility characteristics, and hence there is no reason why these differences should diminish through the redistribution process. The main result of Fleurbaey is that the two intuitions of full compensation and strict compensation are in general incompatible if n ! 4. In the context of the income redistribution model, there will only be a redistribution rule satisfying (2) and (3) for all possible " a a, if f ða i Þ is additively separable in a C i and a R i , i.e., if
In this case there is a natural redistribution mechanism F 0 , assigning to individual k the post-tax income
If f ða i Þ is not additively separable, it is impossible to satisfy full and strict compensation at the same time.
2 1 Fleurbaey and other authors give a host of different axioms and variants of axioms to model these basic intuitions. We only focus on the simplest (and most direct) formulations. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) have extended the approach to the production model. See Fleurbaey (1998) for a more complete overview. 2 Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) describe several distribution mechanisms which satisfy a combination of one axiom with weakened versions of the other. Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) set their problem in the context of income (re)distribution. Because we wanted to test the social acceptance of the intuitions of full and strict compensation in different settings, we also propose an alternative interpretation for the case of health care financing. The function f ða R i ; a C i Þ then gives the medical expenditures of individual i, determined as before by variables for which she is responsible and variables for which she must be compensated. The compensation takes place through a vector of individual subsidies ðx 1 ð" a aÞ; :::; x n ð" a aÞÞ, the sum of which is equal to a fixed amount x. Since all medical expenditures have to be covered, there is an overall budget constraint
where
is the own financial contribution (net of subsidies) of individual i. Full compensation (egalitarianism) then implies that two persons with the same value for the responsibility characteristics should pay the same own contribution, i.e.
Strict compensation implies that two persons with the same value for the compensation characteristics should get the same subsidy:
Equation (9) captures the idea of responsibility-sensitivity, as it implies that differences in medical expenditures following from differences in responsibility-characteristics will be fully reflected in differences in the own contributions. All the redistribution mechanisms defined for the income case can be reformulated easily for the health expenditures-interpretation.
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Both problems summarised in this section raise empirical questions. First, how do people partition the vector a i ? Second, do they feel that full compensation is acceptable? Do they endorse Fleurbaey's intuitions about responsibility, as captured by the idea of strict compensation? Would they pick distribution mechanism (5) in the additively separable case? To what axiom do they give priority if the basic intuitions of full and strict compensation are incompatible? And, in general, are there intercultural differences in these opinions?
The empirical setting
To explore the intercultural dimension of the problem, we organised a questionnaire study in three countries on three different continents: Belgium, Burkina Faso and Indonesia. In all three cases there were two different questionnaires, one on income distribution and one on health care expenditures. These were distributed in a random way and were completed anonymously by first-year university students in an economics class. None of these students had been exposed to any teaching on formal theories of justice. More detailed information on the samples is given in Table 1 . By concentrating on students we could control for much interindividual variation in personal characteristics (such as age and schooling). This gives us a better basis to interpret the remaining differences between the samples as resulting from differences in national (or cultural) background.
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. 4 We will only comment on the first two. In the first part, we wanted to get a better insight into the perception of the responsibility cut. We therefore used a methodology which was already used (among others) by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) , Schokkaert and Overlaet (1988) and Schokkaert and Cape´au (1991) . Respondents were confronted with a series of simple two-person cases where the two persons differed in only one characteristic. The respondents could pick from a list of possibilities the distribution or redistribution that they considered as ''just''. If they wanted, they could add another preferred (re)distribution. These distributions were presented as vectors, without explicit currency units or references to living standards or welfare levels.
With our choice of variants we tried to capture a bit of the abstract philosophical discussion on the responsibility cut. To define concrete variables for the idea of ''personal identity-related'' characteristics, we started from Dworkin's (1981) suggestion and considered individual preferences as the basic characteristic defining the personal identity of the individual. Combining the different possibilities we finally constructed four cases for both the health and the income variant (see Table 2 ). In principle we expect little compensation for the CP-variables (''controlled preferences'' or expensive tastes) and a large degree of compensation for the IR-variables (''involuntary resources'') where both philosophical approaches take the same stance. However, we are well aware that the formulation of our cases is far from perfect. Even in Dworkin's view, Mark may not be responsible for his preferences for being alone, if he does not identify with his psychological problems but considers them as an external constraint to his ambitions (he might wish to be a sociable person). Or it can be argued that an addicted smoker does not fully control his consumption and that his addiction may be due to influences beyond his control, e.g. in his youth. A perfect formulation is impossible, however, and further empirical work should investigate the sensitivity of our findings with respect to the concrete framing of the questions. In the meantime, these caveats should lead to a cautious and qualified interpretation of the results.
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In the second part we varied the description of the hypothetical persons in the cases along two dimensions, one which we considered to be a responsibility-variable (the CP-boxes in Table 2 : choice of a private room and effort respectively), one which we took as a compensation-variable (the variables in the IR-boxes: genetic defects and innate intelligence respectively). As we combine the two dimensions, we now get a set of four-person cases. The description in case A of the pre-tax incomes or the medical expenditures (see appendix) is based on the following specification of f: Elisabeth is more productive because she has a higher natural intelligence
In this additively separable case, it is possible for the respondents to pick the distribution rule (5), satisfying both full and strict compensation. Case B is similar to case A, but the function f is no longer additively separable in the a C and a R -variables:
This means that the respondents have to choose a compromise between the basic ''egalitarian'' and ''responsibility''-intuitions. Following the approach proposed by Amiel and Cowell (1992) , we added a series of verbal questions, where the respondents were confronted with the basic axioms formulated in plain language. They had to report whether they agreed with the statement or not. Afterwards, they were given the opportunity to change their answers on the numerical cases.
Results
We look first at the results of the simple cases indicating the degree of acceptance of different criteria for compensation. In a second subsection we deal explicitly with Fleurbaey's axioms and we focus upon the distributive mechanism chosen by our respondents in the more complex bidimensional setting.
The responsibility cut
The detailed results for the different cases are given in the Appendix. In Table 3 , we grouped the answers of the respondents into four categories. ''No compensation'' refers to the case where the differentiating characteristic is treated as a ''responsibility''-variable and the respondent subscribes to the notion of strict compensation: this leads to an equal distribution of the subsidy in the health case (x i ¼ x j ) and to the status quo-solution (no taxes or transfers) in the income-case. ''Full compensation'' means that the respondent treats the characteristic as a ''compensation''-variable and applies axioms (2) or (8): he has opted for equality of post-tax incomes in the incomecase and for equality of the own contributions in the health case. If the respondent gives a larger subsidy to the person with higher medical expenditures or transfers some income from the person with a high pre-tax income to the person with a low pre-tax income, but without going for complete equality, we say that she has opted for ''intermediate compensation''. If she goes in the opposite direction -a smaller subsidy for higher medical expenditures or a positive tax on the low-income person-we define her position as ''countercompensation.'' Table 3 is still further summarised in Table 4 , giving the proportion of respondents in the complete sample that want to compensate, i.e., the first two rows of the subtables 3. Table 4 gives us a general idea about the location of the responsibility cut. Look at the health-case first. Both philosophical approaches are to a certain degree supported by our results. Both for preferences and resources the rowelement corresponding to ''involuntary'' is larger than the corresponding ''controlled'' element. Both for controlled and involuntary characteristics the ''resources'' column is larger than the ''preferences''-column. On the other hand they are both to a certain extent rejected. About one third of the respondents does compensate for expensive tastes, 42% compensates for ''controlled resources'' and even 73% compensates for ''involuntary preferences''. In general, the overall degree of compensation is rather high in the health-cases. This is much less true in the income-cases. Even innate intelligence is only compensated for by about 50% of the respondents. Differences in effort are definitely seen as a ''responsibility''-factor, even if they follow from the (involuntarily ''chosen'') family background (IP) or are situated in the past (CR). This effect is so strong that it becomes difficult to draw any conclusions about the responsibility cut.
If one were willing to base some conclusions about the responsibility cut on the cells IP and CR in Table 4 (because there the predictions of both philosophical approaches differ), one could say that there is somewhat more support for the Arneson/Cohen than for the Dworkin/Scanlon view. However, as said before, our concrete cases are only a primitive reflection of the subtle philosophical distinctions. A more cautious conclusion could be that, broadly speaking, the basic intuitions of philosophers concerning the importance of responsibility and control on the one hand and of identifying with one's preferences on the other hand are both supported by a large fraction of our (non-academic) respondents. In the real world, however, the sharp conceptual distinctions and theoretical oppositions made by philosophers get somewhat blurred because the intuitions of our respondents in these difficult matters are confused and because the formulation of our cases is imperfect.
The detailed results in Table 3 give some additional insights. Our respondents seem to reject some important starting points of responsibilitysensitive egalitarianism. Look at the health cases first. Respondents, who are willing to compensate, have a clear preference for the so-called intermediate solutions. These solutions do not fit easily into the Fleurbaey framework. More specifically, the axiom of full compensation, i.e., the basic idea of egalitarianism, is quite decisively rejected in these cases. This is even true in case 4, which relates to genetic defects.
At the same time, however, intermediate compensation rules are hardly chosen in the income distribution cases. The differences are especially striking for the IR case 4. While the proportion of respondents who do not want to compensate at all is smaller in the health case than in the income case (see also in the latter than in the former case. Where do these differences come from? A first possible explanation could be that our respondents implement in the health cases a notion of coinsurance. However, health insurance was not mentioned in the formulation of the cases. Moreover, the reference to concrete institutions may not be a convincing explanation for the differences between the income and the health cases, since real world progressive income tax schemes do not lead to a completely egalitarian distribution either. A second possible explanation could be that the interpretation of the cases is not altogether obvious to the respondents. They may have had the feeling that people are partially responsible for some of the described characteristics and should therefore also be partially compensated and these diffuse intuitions may have been more prominent in the health setting than in the income distribution setting. The income distribution cases 1, 2 and 3 show another feature which does not fit into the simple framework of equality of opportunity: a large proportion of respondents chooses a solution with ''countercompensation''. This can be seen as a rejection of the axiom of strict compensation. This axiom basically accepts the existence of a kind of ''natural reward'' scheme, which should not be interfered with through government intervention. A large fraction of our respondents broaden this individualistic notion of responsibility. In their opinion individuals have duties and should in a certain sense be ''punished'' if they do not perform these duties. The government should not only keep intact income differences following from differences in effort-it should punish the lazy. This attitude of enforcing certain kinds of behaviour and discouraging other forms is corroborated by the results in health case 3 with respect to compensation for smokers. Here also there is a significant minority who opts for countercompensation. Obviously, a fraction of our respondents does not accept the liberal notion of freedom, or, more specifically, rejects the idea of a ''natural reward''-scheme. This is especially true for the Burkinese sample.
This brings us to the point of the intercultural differences. The overall picture with respect to the responsibility cut is quite similar in the three samples. Perhaps the Belgian sample is more inclined than the other two to compensate for differences in genetic endowments (health and income distribution case 4). Moreover, Belgian students take a more favourable attitude towards compensation in the health cases. Yet in general it seems fair to say, that apart from the attitude towards countercompensation in Burkina Faso, intercultural differences are much less pronounced than could have been expected. This is a striking result, although it should be interpreted with caution. In each country we have focused on a specific and rather homogeneous subset of the population: the university students. It is quite plausible that there would be bigger differences with representative samples of the respective populations -although this could then be seen as an indication that economic factors are more influential than so-called cultural differences. Moreover, we will show in Sect. 4.2 that the intercultural differences get stronger, when we turn to a more complex setting.
Distributive mechanisms: full and strict compensation
With the previous results in mind we can now turn to the more complicated bidimensional cases. Complete results are shown in the Appendix. The results with respect to the concrete axioms (2) or (8) and (3) or (9) are summarised in Tables 5 and 6 for the health cases and the income distribution cases respectively.
Let us look first at the results for health case A. The first column for Belgium gives the results for the numerical case in our preferred interpretation, in which ''choosing a private room'' is a responsibility-variable and ''lower natural resistance'' a compensation-variable. These results are very similar to the ones we reported for another sample of Belgian students in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998) . Somewhat surprisingly, more than 56% of the students chooses the ''natural solution'' (5). After all, although this solution may be natural from a theoretical point of view, it is much less so for our respondents who do not reason from a complete theoretical background. In fact, at first sight it is much less natural than the equal or proportional solutions which were also among the possibilities. In our previous paper we concluded from this result that the compensation framework seems to be rather close to the moral intuitions of our respondents in the health case. However, the present study gives additional material which is less encouraging.
In the first place, although the ''natural'' solution is also the most popular solution in the Burkinese and Indonesian sample, in these cases only a minority opts for it. In the second place, and perhaps more importantly, we know from the previous section that not all the respondents see the choice of a private room as a ''responsibility'' variable (or a genetic defect as a reason for compensation). It is therefore necessary to reinterpret the answers of the respondents on the more complicated cases in the light of their own positions in the simple cases. To give an example: for someone, who interprets both the choice of a private room and the presence of a genetic defect as compensation variables, the selection of what we called the ''natural solution'' would not be an indication that she accepts the full compensation axiom. Full compensation for her would necessarily imply complete equality of the own contributions of the individuals in case A. We therefore reinterpreted the answers of the respondents in the light of their own personal perception of compensation-and responsibility-variables as could be derived from the first part of the questionnaire: the results are given in the second column (''adjusted''). The differences between the different samples become smaller and so does the degree of acceptance of the axioms. This is exactly what could be expected on the basis of the results in Table 3 , which already showed that intermediate compensation is much more popular than full compensation. In the third place, the answers on the verbal questions (in the third column) show a mixed picture. Averaging over the three samples, about 40% of the respondents accepts the egalitarian idea that ''people who take the same decisions concerning their room in the hospital should bear the same amount of medical expenses''. A larger group (60% in Burkina Faso and Indonesia, 45% in Belgium) thinks that ''the government has to pay an equal subsidy to all people with the same genetic characteristics'', our formulation of strict compensation.
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The pattern of chosen distribution rules (see Appendix) is also mixed. A large fraction of the Burkinese students chooses the proportional solution. The egalitarian solution, in which everybody pays the same own contribution, is hardly taken. Much more popular (certainly in Indonesia) is the so-called ''status quo''-position. The terminology ''status quo'' may be somewhat confusing in the health cases: in fact, in a certain sense this is also an ''egalitarian'' solution, in which the subsidy is distributed equally over the four individuals without any correction for differences in needs. It is not surprising that this easy solution acts as a kind of focal point.
Results are even more mixed in the non-separable health case B. If respondents are forced to choose between full and strict compensation, the former axiom (not surprisingly) is given up. The complexity of case B for unsophisticated respondents perhaps explains why the most popular choice in all three countries is the distribution of the subsidy like in the natural solution of the separable case A (which we call the ''natural solution look-alike''). In case B, this distribution does satisfy strict compensation (but not full compensation). It is very well possible that respondents simply stuck to the choice they made previously in case A (without realising the different consequences in both cases). However, it is also possible that this distribution of the subsidies looks attractive, irrespective of the satisfaction of the axioms. Given the results in Table 3 , one could expect that many respondents would pick a solution which satisfies strict and intermediate (instead of full) compensation. This pattern is indeed present in many of the chosen distribution rules.
Let us now turn to the results for the income distribution problem (Table 6 and Appendix). Here, the differences between cases A and B are less revealing than the differences between the different countries. Some of the intercultural differences which were present in a weak form in the simple questions of Sect. 4.2 reappear here in a strengthened fashion. The pattern which seems to emerge can be summarised with three observations. First, as in the health case, pure and simple income egalitarianism is chosen by an extremely small minority in all three countries. A considerably larger group of respondents select the status-quo solution, i.e., no redistribution at all. This conservative choice is rather popular in Burkina Faso and still more in Indonesia.
Second, in the numerical questions full compensation with respect to differences in innate capacities is a real option for respondents in Belgium only. In fact, while the natural solution (5) is the most popular choice in case A for Belgium, it is not dominant at all in Burkina Faso and Indonesia. Even in Belgium, only about 30% of the respondents chooses this distribution rule -this is about the same proportion as was found in the adjusted results of the health case. 7 The answers on the verbal questions suggest a different pattern, with a large acceptance of full compensation in Burkina Faso. It is instructive, however, to look at the exact formulation of the question: ''Do you think that people who perform the same effort should claim an equal income?'' This formulation does not contain any reference to the non-effort related variables (which implicitly are compensated for when one accepts the statement), while at the same time mentioning explicitly the effort-dimension. Respondents may have reacted to the latter clue. This latter interpretation is certainly in line with the third observation: many respondents prefer countercompensation (where effort is rewarded and laziness punished), and slightly more so in Burkina Faso and Indonesia than in Belgium. This finding is consistent with the results for the simple cases in Table 3 . The idea of a ''duty towards the community'' plays a crucial role in the justice conception of many respondents -in all cultures. 8 We can summarise. The axiom of full compensation is in general much less accepted than the axiom of strict compensation. Intermediate compensation schemes are more popular in the health cases; the income distribution problem is dominated by the idea of countercompensation. Belgian respondents are more oriented towards compensation in the health cases, and more redistribution-oriented in the income cases. The Indonesian respondents are the most conservative in favouring the status-quo option.
It would be interesting to know where these differences come from. They can reflect genuine differences in opinions about justice or point to different attitudes towards conflict. Once one starts to compensate, one has to form an opinion about the degree of compensation and about the variables to be compensated for. Our results show that one should not expect that a social consensus about these questions is reached easily. By choosing the ''statusquo'' option, respondents avoid this difficult debate. No redistribution in the income case and an equal division of the subsidy (which has to be divided in one way or another) in the health case are conflict-avoiding choices. Different attitudes towards justice or towards conflict-avoidance can be a reflection of intercultural differences. However, differences in the social background of our respondents can also be part of the explanation. The Indonesian university of Bandung recruits its students mainly among Catholics of Chinese origin-and it is generally accepted that this is the most entrepreneurially oriented segment of the Indonesian population.
Conclusion
Formal models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism bridge part of the gap between traditional welfarist economics and more modern non-welfarist philosophical ideas. They also offer an opportunity to confront formal economic theory with the actual political and social debate, in which the notion of ''responsibility'' plays an essential role. We have discussed some questionnaire results which can help to understand better the implications and 8 At the time of the pretesting about which we report in Schokkaert and Devooght (1998), we did not add countercompensation as one of the options among which respondents could choose-simply because we did not think about the possibility. Like in the present study, however, respondents could add a preferred distribution of their own to the list we proposed. A significant group of respondents explicitly added countercompensating redistributions in the income distribution problem. This is the reason why we included them in the present version of the questionnaire.
limitations of this approach. The limitations of questionnaire studies are well known. The results for concrete cases may depend on the framing of the questions. Moreover, uninformed opinions of respondents do not offer an alternative for coherent thinking and critical reflection. Nevertheless we feel that our study suggests some intriguing questions for further research.
The basic starting point of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is the problem of ''locating the responsibility cut'', i.e., the question of where to draw the line between variables for which individuals have to be compensated and variables for which they are held responsible. We find some support for the two basic philosophical approaches: that individuals are responsible for the preferences with which they identify and -more strongly-for the idea that they are responsible for the variables which are under their control. Although neither of the two approaches can count on a consensus among our respondents, they both seem relevant to understand the opinions existing in society. Indeed, it can be no surprise that the opinions of our respondents are more diffuse and less sharply formulated than the theories worked out by philosophers as a result of critical reflection.
More intriguing are the questions concerning the culture-dependent nature of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. On the one hand, our questions seem to be well understood and to be perceived as sensible by all three samples. On average respondents in the different countries take a similar position with respect to the location of the responsibility cut. On the other hand there are some striking differences with respect to the concrete distribution rules. In general, our Indonesian students seem to be more efficiency-and less redistribution-oriented than the others. Perhaps, this does not necessarily point to genuine intercultural differences. Differences in the socio-economic background of the respondents may also play a role. As a matter of fact, our Indonesian respondents come from a specific entrepreneurially oriented segment of the population. Without more empirical research (preferably with larger non-student samples) it is impossible to discriminate between these two hypotheses and the question of the culturedependency of justice opinions has to remain open.
From a theoretical point of view, this is not the most basic challenge. Indeed, even among respondents with the same cultural background there is no consensus about the location of the responsibility cut or the acceptance of the specific axioms This could be seen as an argument in favour of a contractualist approach. Empirical research such as the one presented here seems to be eminently useful in such a contractualist setting, whether one takes a culturally relativist stance or not. Moreover, the picture of interindividual differences suggests that the framework used to structure the debate should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate different positions. The present formalisations of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ideas do not seem to be sufficiently rich to represent the opinions of large groups of our respondents.
In the first place the notion of full egalitarianism itself is rejected in many of our cases in favour of what we called ''intermediate compensation'': this is an inequality-reducing intervention, which does not go the whole way towards egalitarianism. At first sight, this cannot be due to the presence of responsibility variables, because these are controlled for in the formulation of the questions. However, it is possible that in any concrete application we are confronted with variables which are not easily classified as either ''responsibility'' or ''compensation''. More specifically, respondents (and even sophisticated scholars) may have the feeling that people should be held partially but not fully responsible for these variables (either because they are only partially under control, or because individuals only partially identify with them) and that there is therefore also room for partial compensation. In our cases both the preference for a more comfortable but more expensive room and addiction to smoking could be examples of such ambiguous variables. It seems worthwhile to try to broaden the framework of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism in order to incorporate this idea of ''intermediate compensation '' (and intermediate responsibility). 9 In the second place, if our respondents really feel that individuals are responsible for their behaviour (smoking and working hard are obvious examples) they sometimes go further than what responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism suggests. Not only should people not be compensated for the consequences of this behaviour, they should even be punished if they smoke or are lazy. We have called this phenomenon ''countercompensation''. This non-liberal attitude is found in all samples, but is most prominent among Burkinese students. This finding raises doubts concerning the principle of ''strict compensation'', or natural reward. It is perfectly logically coherent to claim at the same time that efforts should be remunerated and that the remuneration in the present pre-tax income distribution is not sufficient or is too large. Respondents taking the position that remuneration is insufficient could go for countercompensation, through which they broaden the gap between the lazy and the industrious. Respondents taking the position that the actual remuneration of effort is too large could argue in favour of intermediate compensation.
Finally, a last possibility should be mentioned. All our cases were formulated in a first best setting. This first best approach makes it easier to concentrate on the purely ethical choices. Second best-questions of observability and implementation of the proposed solutions have not been considered or explicitly discarded in the formulation of the questions. However, we cannot be sure that our respondents indeed are capable of ''assuming away'' all the differences we expect them to control for. It is very well possible that second best-considerations implicitly influence their answers. This might be an additional explanation for some of the findings concerning intermediate or countercompensation. However, it also raises a more basic problem. It is possible that information problems crucially and unavoidably determine -or at least influence-the location of the responsibility cut. Would we not all be more egalitarian in a situation of full and perfect information? Further theoretical work should also concentrate on this basic problem of the relationship between first best and second best ethics.
Appendix
This questionnaire will explore some attitudes towards justice and redistribution. We will do this with the help of some hypothetical cases. We are interested in your insights! Because these cases deal with attitudes, there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. Your answers will clarify presuppositions which appear in economic literature and of which we do not know for sure whether they are accepted by the population.
This questionnaire has three parts. We ask you to complete part one before you look at the second part. We will ask you kindly nothing to change in the first part after you have started part two. Your answers would become completely useless for us and you can not gain or lose anything by changing. Finally you can complete part three.
This questionnaire is completely anonymous. Do not write your name on this questionnaire. Thank you for your collaboration.
Part one: Health cases
In the first part we present some cases in which we ask for your personal preference concerning the distribution of certain costs. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.
Health case 1 1) Luke and Mark are both suffering similar effects of lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are effective. Luke chooses for a common room which he shares with other patients. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, opts for a private room in the hospital which gives him more comfort. Due to his choice of a private room, the costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. Health case 2 2) Luke and Mark are both suffering similar effects of lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are effective. Luke chooses for a common room which he shares with other patients. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, has psychological problems with the presence of other people and opts therefore for a private room in the hospital where he is not confronted with other people. Due to his choice for a private room the costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. Health case 3 3) Luke and Mark are both suffering lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are effective. Luke has never been a smoker. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, is a confirmed smoker. Due to his smoking behaviour, the effects of lung cancer are more serious than the effects of lung cancer for Luke. The costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. Health case 4 4) Luke and Mark are both suffering lung cancer. They have the same financial wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. We suppose that all treatments are effective. Luke is born with a normal natural resistance to lung cancer. The costs of his treatment in the hospital are 250. Mark, on the other hand, has a genetic defect and therefore his natural resistance to lung cancer is much weaker. The costs of the treatment of Mark are 750. The government has to divide 500 as a financial contribution to the costs of the treatments of the two persons and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. The government has to divide 500 for the treatments between these patients only and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk ''*'' in the box at the back of the row you prefer.
In row H you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. An intensive cure in a private room costs more than an intensive cure in a normal, common room. Therefore Bart who needs an intensive cure due to his lower resistance to lung cancer, has to pay 250 extra for his private room. A normal cure in a private room costs also more but less than an intensive cure in a private room. Hans who has a normal natural resistance, needs no additional cure and has to pay only 150 extra for his private room. We suppose that all treatments are effective. The government has to divide 500 for the treatments between these patients only and is willing to divide it completely. What would you consider to be a just division of this amount of money? Place an asterisk ''*'' in the box at the back of the row you prefer. In row K you can add an own ideal distribution of the government money. In the first part we present some cases in which we ask for your personal preference concerning taxes and the redistribution of incomes. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.
Income redistribution case 1 1) Both Elisabeth and Catherine have followed the same education and have the same financial wealth at their disposal. They are employed in a similar job and are equally intelligent. Elisabeth chooses to work very hard and to take only little leisure time. Elisabeth receives for her labour an income of 300. Catherine, on the other hand, prefers to take more leisure time and to work less hours a week than Elisabeth. Catherine receives for her labour an income of 200. The government wants to redistribute the income. Redistribution does not influence the behaviour of the two persons. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row L you can add an own ideal redistribution. These differences in productivity are the effects of differences in innate intelligence: Barbara and Babette are more intelligent than Ann and Anna. The situation is complicated by the fact that Barbara and Ann are hard workers which yield them an extra productivity. This extra productivity is remunerated with an extra income of 150 each. Babette and Anna are lazy and do not yield an extra productivity. They do not receive an extra income. The government wants to redistribute the income of these four persons. The knowledge that there will be redistribution does not change the behaviour of the individuals. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? The given numbers are the subsidy received (+) or the tax paid ()). Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row H you can add an own ideal redistribution. They do not receive an extra income. The government wants to redistribute the income of these four persons. The knowledge that there will be redistribution does not change the behaviour of the individuals. What would you consider to be a just redistribution? The given numbers are the subsidy received (+) or the tax paid ()). Please place an asterisk * in the box of your choice. In row K you can add an own ideal redistribution. Now we start the second part, in which we will check in a more direct manner your ideas about justice and redistribution. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. It is important for us that you do not change anything in the previous pages. 
